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Using a panel study of annual NBA data (1989-99), evidence of exit discrimination on career 
length in the NBA is not found. This result is inconsistent with results from data in the 1980s but 
is consistent with more recent findings that have measured wage discrimination in sports in the 
1990s. In a semiparametric duration analysis, it is found that performance variables are 
important in determining career length. These results suggest that team owners in the pursuit of 
championships keep talented players regardless of race. This is an affirmation of Becker's 
theoretical implications of market competition on discrimination. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION  
In the National Basketball Association (NBA), as in most professional sports leagues, player 
turnover is high from season to season due to declining skills as players age. In our analysis, 
we ask: Are there any factors that determine the duration of players with any consistency? Is the 
position in which a player was selected in the draft a significant indicator of duration`? Is there 
any exit discrimination in the career duration where black players have shorter careers than 
white players?  
We examine the determinants of player duration using data covering the 1989-99 period. The 
data include individual player performance statistics on a season-to-season basis as well as 
biographical player data on height, weight, race, and draft number. Our model differs from the 
only previous study on duration in the NBA in that our estimation technique allows for the use of 
a mixed stock and flow sample. Our time period is also longer than the previous study.  
Literature Review  
Sports economics has provided a rich field of study for labor economists to explore issues of 
discrimination. Professional baseball has attracted much of the attention of researchers. Scully 
(1974) found evidence of barriers to entry for black athletes in professional baseball using data 
from 1960-71 and evidence of pay discrimination using data from the late 1960s. Hill and 
Spellman (1984) found no evidence of pay discrimination or barriers to entry using data from the 
1976--77 period. Subsequent studies with later data confirmed the lack of discrimination in 
baseball. Cymrot (1985) suggested that free agency was responsible for this turn of events; 
according to Kahn (1991, 402) the reasons for the reversal of outcomes are unclear.  
Kahn and Sherer (1988) were the first to offer credible evidence of salary discrimination against 
African American professional basketball players. Despite 75% of the players in the league 
being black, data from regressions using 1985-86 salaries suggested a 20% shortfall in 
compensation for African American players, ceteris paribus. The results of other researchers 
using data from the same time period confirmed the conclusions. The source of the 
discrimination was found to be fans by Kahn and Sherer (1988, 56-57), Burdekin and Idson 
(1991), and Brown et al. (1991, 337). Again, however, just as in the case for baseball, studies 
by Hamilton (1997), Dey (1997), and Gius and Johnson (1998) with newer salary data failed to 
find evidence of salary discrimination in the NBA. Despite these findings, Kanazawa and Funk 
(2001) still found the existence of customer discrimination in the cable television Nielsen ratings 
during the 1996--97 season.  
In addition to salary discrimination, labor economists have focused on both entry and exit 
discrimination. For instance, Kahn and Sherer (1988, 53-55) found no evidence of hiring 
discrimination in the NBA, but Brown et al. (1991, 339-43) found only weak evidence that black 
players had to outperform whites for entry into the league. In addition, Johnson and Marple 
(1973) using data from 1970 and Hoang and Rascher (1999, 78) using data from the 1980s, 
both find evidence that white players have a lower probability of being cut from the league. 
Hoang and Rascher (1999, 87-88) find that the effect of "exit discrimination" on career earnings 
in the NBA is larger than the effects of the previously documented wage discrimination.  
The problem with both of the previous studies on exit discrimination is that neither has the ability 
to analyze long careers in the NBA. For instance, the Johnson and Marple study only analyzed 
the career of benchwarmers in the 1970 season. Hoang and Rascher use a panel study of flow 
data that only allows for career length up to nine years, the length of their panel. In our study, 
we analyze exit discrimination by utilizing a combination of stock and flow sample data from the 
1990s that allows us to address both long and short careers.  
Discrimination Theory  
Minority workers may be discriminated against by being paid a lower wage, having more 
difficulty finding a job, or having a lower probability of retention than those of the majority 
workers for comparable productivity. In the case of discrimination due to personal prejudice, 
Becker (1971) notes that the source of personal prejudice is an important determinant of 
whether the discrimination will last.  
According to theory, wage differentials and workplace segregation resulting from prejudice by 
employers and co-workers will dissipate over time in a competitive environment. In sports, free 
agency, the presence of sufficiently qualified minority workers, some nonprejudiced owners and 
fellow players, and the desire to maximize profits and or win championships should alleviate the 
discrimination arising from these sources.  
If the source of the personal prejudice is customers, however, the existence of wage 
discrimination, exit discrimination, and/or segregation may be more difficult to eradicate. 
Employers are responding to profit motivation in the marketplace by discriminating in this 
instance, and competition may not improve the situation. In sports, researchers have long 
suspected that prejudice by fans is present. Scully (1974) suggested that blacks were relegated 
to outfield positions because they would be further away from the more expensive seats and the 
focus of TV cameras. Kanazawa and Funk (2001), using Nielsen ratings from the 1996-97 
season, find that the presence of a white player on a team increases TV ratings that translate 
into more advertising revenues.  
Hoang and Rascher ( 1999, 74-75) postulate the desire of white fans to see white players may 
mean the existence of exit discrimination. According to their reasoning, as owners seek to 
satisfy the discriminatory tastes of the majority white customers they reserve a minimum 
number of roster spots for white players. They further suggest that there is a dwindling supply of 
white rookies who can play at the professional level. Thus fans' taste for white players and a 
dwindling supply of white rookies suggests that an existing white player will enjoy a longer 
career than their black counterpart with similar performance levels.  
To capture the essence of the customer discrimination model, we suggest that exit can be 
modeled as a function of both talent and race. Team owners in the pursuit of profits desire talent 
because fans follow winning teams and team owners desire white players because white 
players bring white fans.  
 
 
II. THE MODEL  
Our data include all individuals who participated in the NBA from 1989 through 1999 for an 11-
year panel consisting of 1113 players. To capture the overall length of players' NBA careers our 
data consists of both stock and flow samples (see Figure 1). A stock sample consists of all 
ongoing careers at the start of the panel in 1989. These left-censored data are easily included 
because we know how many years each player had played in the NBA prior to 1989. Our stock 
sample consists of 295 players who had an average tenure of 6.01 years as they entered the 
1989 season. Including a stock sample captures information on players whose careers are 
longer than the panel data set. For instance, one player during the 1990s had a career length of 
21 years. Using only stock data, however, would underrepresent short-career players, so we 
also include flow data.  
A flow sample includes all careers that start between 1989 and 1999. This sample captures 
many short careers in the NBA. For instance, during the 1990s 134 players had one-year 
careers. Including only flow data, however, would allow for no careers longer than 11 years, 
which is the length of our panel. As with most panels, our data is also rightcensored, where 
many careers were ongoing when our sample ended in 1999. Our rightcensored data include 
both stock and flow observations. To estimate a duration model of stock and flow data, we use a 
technique developed by Berger and Black (1999).  
The variables in our data include both season-variant and season-invariant data. We report the 
means in Table 1. Our seasoninvariant data include the player's height, weight, race, and draft 
number. We find that the average height in the NBA is six feet, seven inches; average weight is 
221 pounds; and 21% of the players are white. Our seasonvariant data are performance data 
that include games played per season as well as assists, rebounds, steals, turnovers, blocked 
shots, and points all calculate per minute played over the season. We report the means by the 
race of the player. We find that white players are on average 2 inches taller and 14 pounds 
heavier. White players also on average play five fewer games per season than black players. 
The average career length as measured by all nonright-censored data is 6 years for whites and 
5.5 years for blacks. To determine if exit discrimination exits in the NBA, we analyze the data 
using both nonparametric and semiparametric techniques.  
Nonparametric Estimates of Career Duration  












III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS IN A GENERAL CONTEXT  
Hoang and Rascher (1999) suggested that the effect on career earnings of exit discrimination 
was over twice as large as the effect of pay discrimination in the 1980s. The apparent 
disappearance of pay discrimination from the NBA in the 1990s would not mean an end to 
unequal career earnings if exit discrimination persisted. Our results indicate that exit 
discrimination no longer exists in the NBA.  
The importance of these results extends beyond the courts of the NBA. Kahn (2000) discussed 
the use of research in the area of professional sports as a laboratory for testing general labor 
market propositions. Various laws in this country have helped moderate the level of racial pay 
discrimination in the labor market. In contrast to the black economic progress portrayed by 
Smith and Welch (1989), more recent research suggests that the progress enjoyed by minorities 
in entry-level positions is not sustained throughout their careers. Sexton and Olsen (1994) find 
that blacks have acquired less on-the-job training than their white counterparts and that the 
training they do acquire is not likely to increase their pay. Bratsberg and Terrell (1998) suggest 
that returns to general experience for black employees trail those for white employees. It is 
doubtful that legislative means can end such labor market outcomes.  
The area of professional sports provides an excellent setting to study the effects of market 
competition on discrimination outlined by Becker (1971 ). Most franchises have the stated or 
purported purpose to win games and/or championships. This objective function may serve to 
increase attendance and hopefully franchise profits or may satisfy the needs of a sportsman 
entrepreneur or civic-minded owner seeking to provide a winning team for his or her city. The 
competition to provide winning teams should eliminate the existence of discrimination in 
employment. Conflict may arise, however, if the source of discrimination is fans. The results of 
Kanazawa and Funk (2001) suggest lingering fan discrimination into the mid- to late 1990s. 
However, although ceteris paribus results may indicate an improvement in attendance and/or 
TV ratings for an increase in the number of white players on a franchise, particularly in areas 
with a higher percentage of white population, the management of the franchise must weigh this 
against the overwhelming impact of winning on attendance.  
The lack of exit discrimination found in our study indicates that winning games supersedes even 
the tastes of fans' racial preferences. These results seem to be a resounding affirmation of 
Becker's theoretical implications. Outside the realm of professional sports, where objective 
statistics of employee performance and firm performance are not so readily available, the 
implications for Becker's model of the findings of unequal promotional attainment and onthe-job 
training by minorities is unclear. Our results, however, suggest that if competition is present 
performance on the job may now supersede race as the prime determinant of employee 
retention.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
We use a panel study of annual NBA data to examine the exit discrimination on career length in 
the NBA. We find that performance variables are important determinants in career length where 
more productive players have longer careers. This result suggests that team owners in the 
pursuit of championships and profits keep talented players. In our analysis, we also find that big 
men are predicted to have longer careers than small men. We do not, however, find exit 
discrimination in the NBA in the 1990s. This result is inconsistent with results from data in the 
past that has found exit discrimination but is consistent with more recent findings that have 
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